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2. Protect/Detect

1. Vulnerablility Characterization and Assessment​

μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” μ‹λ³„λœ 취약점을 νŠΉμ„±ν™”(characterize)ν•˜κ³  평가(assess)ν•΄μ•Ό 함.
ENThe FDA recommends that manufacturers characterize and assess identified vulnerabilities because it will provide information that will aid manufacturers to triage remediation activities.
KRFDAλŠ” μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ μ‹λ³„λœ 취약점을 νŠΉμ„±ν™”(characterize)ν•˜κ³  평가(assess)ν•  것을 ꢌμž₯ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€. μ΄λŠ” μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ μœ„ν—˜κ°œμ„  ν™œλ™μ˜ μš°μ„ μˆœμœ„λ₯Ό μ •ν•˜λŠ” 데 도움이 λ˜λŠ” 정보λ₯Ό μ œκ³΅ν•˜κΈ° λ•Œλ¬Έμž…λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENWhen characterizing the exploitability of a vulnerability, the manufacturer should consider factors such as remote exploitability, attack complexity, threat privileges, actions required by the user, exploit code maturity, and report confidence.
KRμ·¨μ•½μ μ˜ μ•…μš© κ°€λŠ₯μ„±(exploitability)을 νŠΉμ„±ν™”ν•  λ•Œ, μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” 원격 μ•…μš© κ°€λŠ₯μ„±(remote exploitability), 곡격 λ³΅μž‘μ„±(attack complexity), μœ„ν˜‘ κΆŒν•œ(threat privileges), μ‚¬μš©μžμ—κ²Œ μš”κ΅¬λ˜λŠ” 행동(actions required by the user), μ•…μš© μ½”λ“œ μ„±μˆ™λ„(exploit code maturity), 보고 신뒰도(report confidence)와 같은 μš”μ†Œλ“€μ„ κ³ λ €ν•΄μ•Ό ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENScoring systems such as the β€œCommon Vulnerability Scoring System” (CVSS) provide a consistent framework for assessing exploitability by quantifying the impact of the factors that influence exploitability.
KRβ€œκ³΅ν†΅ 취약점 점수 μ‹œμŠ€ν…œ(Common Vulnerability Scoring System, CVSS)”과 같은 점수 체계(scoring systems)λŠ” μ΄λŸ¬ν•œ μš”μ†Œλ“€μ΄ μ•…μš© κ°€λŠ₯성에 λ―ΈμΉ˜λŠ” 영ν–₯을 μˆ˜μΉ˜ν™”ν•˜μ—¬ μΌκ΄€λœ 평가 ν”„λ ˆμž„μ›Œν¬λ₯Ό μ œκ³΅ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.

2. Risk Analysis and Threat Modeling​

μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” μœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§μ„ ν¬ν•¨ν•œ μ‚¬μ΄λ²„λ³΄μ•ˆ μœ„ν—˜ 뢄석을 μˆ˜ν–‰ν•˜κ³ , TPLC λ™μ•ˆ ν•΄λ‹Ή 뢄석을 μ—…λ°μ΄νŠΈν•΄μ•Ό 함.
ENThe FDA recommends that manufacturers conduct cybersecurity risk analyses that include threat modeling for each of their devices and to update those analyses over time.
KRFDAλŠ” μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ 각 기기에 λŒ€ν•΄ μœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§(threat modeling)을 ν¬ν•¨ν•œ μ‚¬μ΄λ²„λ³΄μ•ˆ μœ„ν—˜ 뢄석(cybersecurity risk analyses)을 μˆ˜ν–‰ν•˜κ³ , μ‹œκ°„μ΄ 지남에 따라 ν•΄λ‹Ή 뢄석을 μ—…λ°μ΄νŠΈν•  것을 ꢌμž₯ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENRisk analyses and threat modeling should aim to triage vulnerabilities for timely remediation.
KRμœ„ν—˜ 뢄석과 μœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§μ€ 취약점을 μ‹ μ†νžˆ μœ„ν—˜μ„ κ°œμ„ ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•΄ μš°μ„ μˆœμœ„λ₯Ό μ •ν•˜λŠ” 데 λͺ©μ μ„ 두어야 ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENThreat modeling is a procedure for optimizing Network/Application/Internet Security by identifying objectives and vulnerabilities, and then defining countermeasures to prevent, or mitigate the effects of, threats to the system.
KRμœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§μ€ λ„€νŠΈμ›Œν¬/μ• ν”Œλ¦¬μΌ€μ΄μ…˜/인터넷 λ³΄μ•ˆμ„ μ΅œμ ν™”ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•œ 절차둜, λͺ©ν‘œ(objectives)와 취약점(vulnerabilities)을 μ‹λ³„ν•œ λ’€ μ‹œμŠ€ν…œμ— λŒ€ν•œ μœ„ν˜‘(threats)을 μ˜ˆλ°©ν•˜κ±°λ‚˜ κ·Έ 영ν–₯을 μ™„ν™”ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•œ λŒ€μ‘μ±…(countermeasures)을 μ •μ˜ν•˜λŠ” κ³Όμ •μž…λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENThreat modeling provides traditional risk management and failure mode analysis paradigms, and a framework to assess threats from active adversaries/malicious use.
KRμœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§μ€ 전톡적인 μœ„ν—˜ 관리(risk management)와 κ³ μž₯ λͺ¨λ“œ 뢄석(failure mode analysis) νŒ¨λŸ¬λ‹€μž„μ„ μ œκ³΅ν•˜λ©°, 적극적인 곡격자(active adversaries)/μ•…μ˜μ  μ‚¬μš©(malicious use)μœΌλ‘œλΆ€ν„°μ˜ μœ„ν˜‘μ„ ν‰κ°€ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•œ ν”„λ ˆμž„μ›Œν¬λ₯Ό μ œκ³΅ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENFor each vulnerability, a summary report should be produced that concisely summarizes the risk analysis and threat modeling information.
KR각 취약점에 λŒ€ν•΄μ„œλŠ” μœ„ν—˜ 뢄석과 μœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§ 정보λ₯Ό κ°„κ²°ν•˜κ²Œ μš”μ•½ν•œ λ³΄κ³ μ„œ(summary report)λ₯Ό μž‘μ„±ν•΄μ•Ό ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENDue to the cyclical nature of the analyses, the information should be traceable to related documentation.
KRμ΄λŸ¬ν•œ 뢄석은 μˆœν™˜μ (cyclical) νŠΉμ„±μ„ κ°€μ§€λ―€λ‘œ, κ΄€λ ¨ λ¬Έμ„œ(documentation)와 좔적 κ°€λŠ₯ν•΄μ•Ό ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.

3. Analysis of Threat Sources​

μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” κ°€λŠ₯ν•œ μœ„ν˜‘ μ›μ²œ(threat sources)을 뢄석해야 함.
ENThe FDA recommends manufacturers to analyze possible threat sources.
KRFDAλŠ” μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ κ°€λŠ₯ν•œ μœ„ν˜‘ μ›μ²œ(threat sources)을 뢄석할 것을 ꢌμž₯ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENA threat source is defined as the intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability.
KRμœ„ν˜‘ μ›μ²œμ€ 취약점을 μ˜λ„μ μœΌλ‘œ μ•…μš©ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•œ μ˜λ„(intent)와 방법(method), λ˜λŠ” 취약점을 우발적으둜(trigger accidentally) μœ λ°œν•  수 μžˆλŠ” 상황과 λ°©λ²•μœΌλ‘œ μ •μ˜λ©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENAnalysis of threat sources, as part of risk analysis and threat modeling provides a framework for risk introduced by an active adversary.
KRμœ„ν˜‘ μ›μ²œ 뢄석은 μœ„ν—˜ 뢄석(risk analysis)κ³Ό μœ„ν˜‘ λͺ¨λΈλ§(threat modeling)의 μΌλΆ€λ‘œμ„œ, 적극적인 곡격자(active adversary)에 μ˜ν•΄ λ°œμƒν•˜λŠ” μœ„ν—˜μ„ 평가할 수 μžˆλŠ” ν”„λ ˆμž„μ›Œν¬λ₯Ό μ œκ³΅ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENTherefore, characterization of threat sources will be advantageous to manufacturers in accessing risks not covered by traditional failure mode analysis methods.
KRλ”°λΌμ„œ μœ„ν˜‘ μ›μ²œμ„ νŠΉμ„±ν™”(characterization)ν•˜λŠ” 것은 전톡적인 κ³ μž₯ λͺ¨λ“œ 뢄석(failure mode analysis) λ°©λ²•μœΌλ‘œλŠ” 닀루어지지 μ•ŠλŠ” μœ„ν—˜μ„ ν‰κ°€ν•˜λŠ” 데 μ œμ‘°μ‚¬μ— μœ λ¦¬ν•˜κ²Œ μž‘μš©ν•  κ²ƒμž…λ‹ˆλ‹€.

4. Incorporation of Threat Detection Capabilities​

μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” 곡격 λ°œμƒ μ‹œ κΈ°κΈ°κ°€ μœ„ν˜‘μ„ νƒμ§€ν•˜κ³ , λ²•μ˜ν•™μ μœΌλ‘œ νƒ€λ‹Ήν•œ 증거 확보λ₯Ό ν•  수 μžˆλŠ” 섀계 κΈ°λŠ₯을 ν¬ν•¨ν•˜λŠ” 것을 κ³ λ €ν•΄μ•Ό 함.
ENMedical devices may not be capable of detecting threat activity and may be reliant on network monitoring.
KRμ˜λ£ŒκΈ°κΈ°λŠ” μœ„ν˜‘ ν™œλ™(threat activity)을 탐지할 수 μžˆλŠ” λŠ₯λ ₯이 없을 μˆ˜λ„ 있으며, λ„€νŠΈμ›Œν¬ λͺ¨λ‹ˆν„°λ§μ— μ˜μ‘΄ν•  수 μžˆμŠ΅λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENManufacturers should consider the incorporation of design features that establish or enhance the ability of the device to detect and produce forensically sound postmarket evidence capture in the event of an attack. This information may assist the manufacturer in assessing and remediating identified risks.
KRμ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” 곡격 λ°œμƒ μ‹œ κΈ°κΈ°κ°€ μœ„ν˜‘μ„ νƒμ§€ν•˜κ³ , λ²•μ˜ν•™μ μœΌλ‘œ νƒ€λ‹Ήν•œ(forensically sound) μ‹œνŒ ν›„(postmarket) 증거 확보λ₯Ό μˆ˜ν–‰ν•  수 μžˆλŠ” λŠ₯λ ₯을 κ΅¬μΆ•ν•˜κ±°λ‚˜ κ°•ν™”ν•˜λŠ” 섀계 κΈ°λŠ₯(design features)을 ν¬ν•¨ν•˜λŠ” 것을 κ³ λ €ν•΄μ•Ό ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.

5. Impact Assessment on All Devices​

μ œμ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” μ‚¬μ΄λ²„λ³΄μ•ˆ μ‹ ν˜Έμ˜ 영ν–₯을 μˆ˜ν‰μ (μ œν’ˆ 포트폴리였) 그리고 수직적(μ œν’ˆ κ΅¬μ„±μš”μ†Œ)으둜 평가할 수 μžˆλŠ” ν”„λ‘œμ„ΈμŠ€λ₯Ό μˆ˜λ¦½ν•΄μ•Ό 함.
ENThe FDA recommends that manufacturers have a process to assess the impact of a cybersecurity signal horizontally (i.e., across all medical devices within the manufacturer’s product portfolio and sometimes referred to as variant analyses) and vertically (i.e., determine if there is an impact on specific components within the device).
KRFDAλŠ” μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ μ‚¬μ΄λ²„λ³΄μ•ˆ μ‹ ν˜Έ(cybersecurity signal)의 영ν–₯을 μˆ˜ν‰μ μœΌλ‘œ(즉, μ œμ‘°μ‚¬μ˜ μ œν’ˆ 포트폴리였 λ‚΄ λͺ¨λ“  μ˜λ£ŒκΈ°κΈ°μ— 걸쳐, ν”νžˆ 변이 뢄석[variant analyses]이라 뢈림) 그리고 수직적으둜(즉, κΈ°κΈ° λ‚΄ νŠΉμ • ꡬ성 μš”μ†Œμ— 영ν–₯이 μžˆλŠ”μ§€ μ—¬λΆ€λ₯Ό κ²°μ •) 평가할 수 μžˆλŠ” ν”„λ‘œμ„ΈμŠ€λ₯Ό κ°–μΆœ 것을 ꢌμž₯ν•©λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENA signal may identify a vulnerability in one device, and that same vulnerability may impact other devices including those in development, or those not yet cleared, approved or marketed.
KRν•˜λ‚˜μ˜ μ‹ ν˜Έκ°€ νŠΉμ • 기기의 취약점을 식별할 수 있으며, λ™μΌν•œ 취약점이 개발 쀑인 κΈ°κΈ°λ‚˜ 아직 μŠΉμΈΒ·ν—ˆκ°€Β·νŒλ§€λ˜μ§€ μ•Šμ€ λ‹€λ₯Έ 기기에도 영ν–₯을 λ―ΈμΉ  수 μžˆμŠ΅λ‹ˆλ‹€.
ENTherefore, it will be advantageous to manufacturers to conduct analyses for cybersecurity signals such that expended detection resources have the widest impact.
KRλ”°λΌμ„œ μ œμ‘°μ‚¬κ°€ μ‚¬μ΄λ²„λ³΄μ•ˆ μ‹ ν˜Έμ— λŒ€ν•œ 뢄석을 μˆ˜ν–‰ν•˜μ—¬ 탐지 μžμ›(detection resources)이 κ°€μž₯ 넓은 λ²”μœ„μ— 영ν–₯을 λ―ΈμΉ˜λ„λ‘ ν•˜λŠ” 것이 μœ λ¦¬ν•  κ²ƒμž…λ‹ˆλ‹€.